Dr Imogen Jones, 15th december 2023
I have been thinking a lot about respect and deceased bodies recently and, in pursuing this, google led to me to one of the many news stories that I have missed. I stumbled across a blog by Kate Slater, who is a Senior Associate at Kingsley Napley. Written back in July, Slater noted that:
‘Ingrid Newkirk, the founder and president of PeTA (the largest animal rights organisation in the world) has updated her will, which includes a number of creative yet unsettling directions regarding what should be done with her body after her death. These reportedly include peeling and curing her skin to make into leather fashion accessories, displaying her broken leg at the Grand National, and sending an eye to the UK Home Office, amongst many other similarly grisly directions. It is reported on the PeTA website that Ingrid Newkirk’s bodily bequests are intended to inspire animal activists, to continue to help animals and to honour her own commitment to use her body in a manner that draws attention to needless animal suffering and exploitation.’
The PeTA website includes this helpful infographic, summarising the key elements of her ‘bequests’.
These raise some interesting issues regarding the treatment of deceased bodies, and reminded me of the work I previously carried out on the idea of corpse desecration as a legal offence. In that context, I used the example of music producer Kim Fowley, who had contacted the magazine ‘Girls and Corpses’ with the request that his mutilated corpse feature on a centrefold. He said that the models ‘could mutilate the body, providing real blood & guts and set my bones and blood on fire’.
I don’t plan to rehearse arguments made in that piece regarding desecration as a legal offence, not least because I came down on the side of consent being morally transformative and that the law ought to reflect that). I also want to assume for the sake of argument that Newkirk’s wishes could be construed as acts of mutilation (as is the case for lots of things we do to bodies that are, for example, donated to science – the consent matters).
However, there is, I think, some interesting differences between what Foley wanted and what Newkirk is requesting. These centre on the actual and intended impact on the desired audience. Grim as Foley’s request was, he seemed to wish both to permit others to do as they wished and for any publication of this to in a magazine where the readership actively sought out corpse-related images. Newkirk, on the other hand, is seeking to making a political point by having her body divided and distributed in a way which appears to be intended to cause distress to others. I think this difference is ethically important in a way which the law also ought to reflect.
To discuss, I separate the ‘bequests’ into those which are necessarily intended to be distressing and those where there might be an argument for other, albeit also politically motivated, justifications.
1. Just plain nasty
- Sending an eye to the NIH and one to the Home Office
- Using intestines as sausage casings and sending them to Salt Bae
- Breaking a leg and then displaying this at the Kentucky derby or Grand National
This subset appears to be entirely motivated to cause others distress. The fact that the recipients may or may not experience this is, in my view, immaterial because it would be reasonable for them to do so. In all cases there is also a risk of multiple people being unwillingly exposed to these body parts and experiencing resultant distress. In such cases, there is a real risk that the recipients may experience psychological harm. For someone who professes to wanting to encourage kindness (to non-humans), that’s a bit, well, unkind. In such cases, it is worth noting that the ‘bequests’ may fall foul of the offence of ‘Outraging Public Decency’.
2. Point making but not necessarily hurt/harmful
- BBQ of some flesh
- Using skin to make a purse and belt
- Use foot (and lower leg?) to make a human umbrella stand
- I would add here that, if not sent for display at a major horse racing event, the broken foot could be a work of art, many of which convey political meaning (legal arguments relating to this and public decency in R v Gibson (1991) 2 QB 619 notwithstanding).
If the recipients of these body parts, modified as intended, wanted to receive them then that is more difficult. Newkirk consented, they consent, and the uses are potentially useful and/or works of art. I do not wish to get diverted into discussions regarding the use of warnings in art exhibitions (but it’s not hard and could save distress, so really, why not…) or whether these could become property because of the skill required to transform them into these items (on this see the extensive academic treatment of Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 496 and subsequent cases).
What I want instead to think about is what this tells us about the relationship between the law and deceased bodies. I find myself returned to the idea of (dis)respect. In my previous work I hinged my argument on the concept of respect to the deceased person. I assumed that, absent consent, the mutilating acts were done with malintent. Here, if we accept that consent negates any argument of disrespect (or, if you prefer, hurt/harm) to the deceased person, the mutilating acts – or at least the plan for their distribution, is intended to cause harm to others. I am not sure that is about respect, though certainly we might say that is not a respectful way to behave (whether grounded in autonomy, culture or other).
It also highlights how in death as well as life our bodies can be invoked as emotional weaponry. The treatment and use if our bodies can be used to hurt others – that can work in both directions. Deceased bodies gain their power from their significance as representations of a now deceased person. They are politically powerful. Quite what is therefore acceptable, or distressing, will be both culturally and individually contingent. Law has to operate at a general/jurisdictional level and it strikes me as reasonable for law to play a role in preventing intentional harms such as those Newkirk intends. Whether it is equipped to do so without judicial creativity/potential overcriminalisation is not something for this blog.
A postscript: I am veganish (‘flexan’?) so I am probably more sympathetic to PeTA’s work/arguments re the kindness to non-animals. But I’m am yet to be convinced that this should be achieved by being unkind to others.
Dead Bodies and the Law 